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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

JEFF CLAUDE REED,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

Case No. 990973-CA
Priority No. 15

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996), this Court has jurisdiction
over the state's appeal from the trial court's dismissal of the Information charging one
count of possession of a controlled substance precursor or possession of laboratory
equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation, a
first degree felony. See Addendum A containing Order to Dismiss from which the state
appeals. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996) provides that the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over "appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996)
(emphasis added); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1996) (Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over appeals from convictions for first degree or capital felonies). Since this
case involves an appeal from a dismissal of the charges in a criminal case, Section

78-2a-3(2)(e) controls and designates that this Court has original jurisdiction.1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION
Issue. Police officers found a methamphetamine laboratory in the downstairs
bedroom of a house Appellee occupied with at least four other people. The downstairs
bedroom where the laboratory was found was rented to two people other than Appellee.
The issue in this case is whether the trial court correctly quashed the bindover where the
state failed to establish a sufficient nexus between Appellee and the methamphetamine
laboratory found in the downstairs bedroom so as to establish probable cause to believe
Appellee had constructive possession over the laboratory equipment found in that room?
Standard of Review.

fU

[T]he ultimate decision of whether to bind a defendant over

for trial presents a question of law which [is reviewed] de novo without deference.'"
State v. Hutchings. 950 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Jaeger, 896
P.2d 42, 44 (Utah App. 1995)); see also State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App.
1994) (reviewing ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss made at the close of state's case
for correctness).
The principles applicable to a decision as to whether to bind a defendant over for

1

The state filed this case in the Supreme Court and claimed in its docketing statement
filed in that Court that the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction. On January 25, 2000, the
Supreme Court issued a letter indicating that this case had been assigned to this Court. Because
this case involves the dismissal of criminal charges rather than a conviction, it is properly before
this Court as part of its original jurisdiction rather than pursuant to the Supreme Court's pour
over powers. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) & 0) (1996).
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trial are considered in determining whether a trial judge correctly quashed a bindover
order. State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995). In order to bind a defendant
over for trial, "the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to establish that 'the
crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it."1 Pledger,
896 P.2d at 1229 (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(2)). "In making a determination as to
probable cause, the magistrate should view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution." Id at 1229. The
probable cause standard applicable to proof at preliminary hearings does not require that
the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt or a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant committed the crime. State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1998). Instead,
the probable cause standard for bindover requires that the state "present a quantum of
evidence sufficient to warrant submission of the case to the trier of fact." Id (further
citations omitted). "Moreover, '[u]nless the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of
reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim,' the
magistrate should bind the defendant over for trial." Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 (quoting
Cruzv.Montova, 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983)).
The probable cause showing required at a preliminary hearing is different from,
and requires a greater showing than, the probable cause necessary for an arrest warrant.
State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1980). The state "must establish a prima
facie case against the defendant from which the trier of fact could conclude the defendant
3

was guilty of the offense as charged." Id at 783. The level of proof required to bind a
defendant over for trial is equivalent to the level of proof required to withstand a motion
for directed verdict. Id., fn. 12.
Preservation. This issue was preserved in the trial court (R. 103-21; 137:1-13).
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES
The text of the following statutes is in Addendum B:
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 (1998);
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 (Supp. 1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In an Information filed December 22,1998, the state charged Defendant/Appellee
("Appellee" or "Jeff) with one count of possession of a precursor and/or laboratory
equipment or supplies with intent to engage in a clandestine lab operation, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(l)(a) and/or (b) (R. 3-4). The crime
charged in the Information was alleged to have occurred "on or about December 16,
1998" (R. 3).
Following a preliminary hearing held on April 27, 1999, the Honorable Joseph
Fratto, sitting as a magistrate, bound Appellee over for trial (R. 29, 136). Appellee filed a
motion to quash the bindover in the trial court (R. 103-08). After the state responded
(R. 109-10) and Appellee filed a reply memorandum (R. 113-21), the trial judge held a
hearing on the motion to quash (R. 137). At the close of the hearing, the trial judge

4

granted Appellee's motion to quash the bindover (R. 137:12). On October 19, 1999, the
trial court entered its order granting the motion to dismiss (R. 122; see Addendum A).
The state filed a timely notice of appeal on November 10, 1999 (R. 123).2
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 16, 1998, West Jordan police officers executed a search warrant on
a house owned by Carol Jean Peterson (R. 136:5, 6, 9, 41). Carol Peterson, her sixteenyear-old son, and Appellee Jeff Reed were in the living room on the main floor of the
home when the officers entered (R. 136:6). Jeff had moved into the house about two
weeks earlier, and shared an upstairs bedroom with Carol (R. 136:9, 41, 42).
After locating Carol, her son and Jeff, police officers searched Carol's house and
the personal belongings of Carol and Jeff (R. 136:7, 13). In a downstairs, southwest
bedroom, officers found what appeared to be a methamphetamine laboratory (R. 136:8,
33-4, 36). The items found in the downstairs bedroom included, among other things, a
heating element, two glass beakers, some tubing, a grinder which Officer Davis indicated
was used for grinding pseudoephedrine, a pan with liquid that turned out to be
methamphetamine, Pyrex cookware, and pseudoephedrine in liquid and tablet form

2

The state indicates in its brief that this case involves an issue which fits within priority
number 2 of Utah R. App. P. 29(b). Priority number 2 under Utah R. App. P. 29(b) includes
M
[a]ppeals from convictions in all other [non-death penalty] criminal matters with priority to
cases in which the defendant is incarcerated." (Emphasis added.) This case involves a dismissal
rather than a conviction and therefore does not fit within priority number 2. Instead, this case
falls under the catchall provision of priority number 15. See Utah R. App. P. 29 (b)(15).
5

(R. 136:7-8, 27,33, 35).
The only other methamphetamine, precursor or laboratory equipment located by
officers during their search was a small amount of methamphetamine found in Carol's
fanny pack (R. 136:13). In addition, the bedroom of Carol's son, located downstairs in
the northeast comer, tested positive for flash residue (R. 136:29). The officer was not
sure whether that meant there was finished product in the son's bedroom (R. 136:29).
Officers did not find methamphetamine, a precursor or laboratory equipment
among Jeffs belongings or in the bedroom he occupied. Other than the
methamphetamine found in Carol's purse and the flash residue in her son's bedroom, the
officers did not indicate that they found methamphetamine, precursors, or laboratory
equipment at any place in the house other than the downstairs, southwest bedroom where
the methamphetamine laboratory was found. Jeff occupied an upstairs bedroom and did
not occupy either of the downstairs bedrooms (R. 136:28-29, 30, 41).
Carol had rented the downstairs bedroom where officers found the
methamphetamine laboratory to Lisa Taylor, who shared the room with Jay Williams
(R. 136:29, 55). Carol had given this information to officers and had told them that Jeff
did not occupy the downstairs bedroom (R. 136:29, 30). Jay was "an A
methamphetamine cook" and Lisa was very knowledgeable about methamphetamine
production and chemicals (R. 136:55). They both had used methamphetamine in Carol's
house, as did Carol and Jeff, but Carol testified that she did not know that Jay and Lisa
6

had a methamphetamine lab in her house (R. 136:44, 56). Detective Davis believed,
however, that Carol knew about the lab and sold methamphetamine out of her house
(R. 136:23, 24). The officers were unable to locate Jay and Lisa (R. 136:30).
State investigators took fingerprints in the downstairs bedroom but did not present
any evidence that Jeffs fingerprints were found in the room where the methamphetamine
laboratory was located (R. 136:37).
The state offered Carol an enormous benefit for testifying against Jeff (R. 136:39,
52). Carol was charged in this case as a co-defendant who committed the first degree
minimum mandatory clandestine lab offense; she was also charged by herself with
possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony (R. 3-4). In exchange for her
testimony against Jeff, Carol was given the opportunity to plead guilty to two third degree
felonies, with the first degree minimum mandatory felony being dismissed (R. 136:39).
The two guilty pleas were to be held in abeyance and dismissed if Carol successfully
completed the Drug Court Program (R. 136:39). In addition, the state would not charge
Carol with possession or distribution of a controlled substance, both of which she
admitted during her testimony (R. 136:52). Detective Davis indicated that it was not
unusual for someone who is as deeply involved in drugs as Carol was to blame someone
else for the commission of a crime (R. 136:25).
Carol testified consistently with her statement to officers, that Jeff was not
involved in any way with methamphetamine production in the laboratory in the basement
7

of her house (R. 136:43, 54). According to Carol, Jeff had claimed to be involved in
methamphetamine production, but he did not produce methamphetamine at her house
(R. 136:44, 56). Jeff told Carol that he knew how to make methamphetamine and that he
was planning to make methamphetamine or "throw a big batch" at some time (R. 136:44).
Carol did not know when or where that might be (R. 136:44). In fact, Carol testified that
when Jeff talked about making methamphetamine, she "felt we were chasing tails"
(R. 136:56). She was certain Jeff was not making methamphetamine in her house and did
not know specifically of any place else where he might have been making
methamphetamine (R. 136:56).
Iodine, red phosphorous found in the striker plates of matchbooks, and
pseudoephedrine are used in the production of methamphetamine (R. 136:35-6). People
also grind tablets containing pseudoephedrine or ephedrine in a coffee grinder, then soak
the grounds in solvent (R. 136:37). The solvent can be water, paint thinner or acetone
(R. 136:37). Carol acknowledged that there was acetone in her house and that acetone
was used for cleaning up product (R. 136:48).
Carol knew that Jeff was planning to purchase iodine but did not know whether
that ever happened (R. 136:44). Carol assumed iodine crystals would be used to make
methamphetamine but did not know whether Jeff had told her he planned to use iodine
crystals for that purpose (R. 136:46). She also knew that Jeff had purchased
pseudoephedrine at some point and assumed that it was purchased to make
8

methamphetamine (R. 136:45). Carol explained that because people can purchase only a
limited amount of pseudoephedrine, others can buy pseudoephedrine and profit by selling
or trading it to people who produce methamphetamine (R. 136:45). Jeff told Carol he
purchased pseudoephedrine to repay a debt (R. 136:46).
At some unspecified point prior to December 16, 1998, Jeff had pseudoephedrine
tablets in Carol's bedroom (R. 136:47). The pseudoephedrine tablets were in a bowl; Jeff
added acetone or alcohol to the tablets (R. 136:47, 48). Carol also saw Jeff with six or
eight matchbooks which he ripped apart (R. 136:48). The incident involving the
matchbooks, and possibly the pseudoephedrine in the bowl, occurred when Jeff and Carol
were contemplating setting up Carol's ex-husband (R. 136:60). Neither the
pseudoephedrine nor the matchbooks ever made it to a methamphetamine laboratory; nor
were they located when officers conducted the search in this case. Instead, the
matchbooks were thrown away and the pseudoephedrine may have been flushed down the
toilet (R. 136:60-1). Those items were not obtained in order to produce
methamphetamine (R. 136:60-1; 137:7).
Carol also testified that on Thanksgiving Day, about three weeks prior to the
incident charged in this case and possibly before Jeff lived in Carol's house, Jay and Lisa
condensed some oils in Carol's bedroom (R. 136:41, 42, 63). Carol thought the process
was not dangerous, so she let Jay and Lisa condense the oils because Carol was curious
(R. 136:63). Jeff was at the house but spent most of the day watching the game in the
9

front room (R. 136:63). Jeff was not in the room when Jay and Lisa were condensing the
oils, but Jeff did go in later to clean up and tried to recondense the oils (R. 136:63).
Carol had sold methamphetamine (R. 136:42). She never purchased
methamphetamine from Jeff, but on one occasion, Jeff brought some methamphetamine
into the house which he apparently shared with Carol (R. 136:49).
After conducting the search, the officers interrogated Jeff after informing him of
his Miranda rights (R. 136:8, 17-8). Although the officers used intimidating interrogation
techniques which are aimed at getting people to talk about a crime, Jeff repeatedly denied
involvement in the production of methamphetamine in the house (R. 136:16, 17). Jeff
told the officers that "he was not aware of what was going on with any type of narcotics
dealings" and did not know what was going on downstairs (R. 136:8, 9, 18-9). While Jeff
repeatedly denied involvement with the production of methamphetamine in the house and
denied knowledge of the existence of the lab in the downstairs bedroom, he did
acknowledge to the officers that "there were some things going on with people staying
and some other things that he didn't want to get involved with" (R. 136:16, 17, 21). He
also acknowledged that he heard glass and "I heard lab and I heard finish and, you know,
it don't take a rocket scientist to put it all together" (R. 136:10).
Jeff was honest and forthcoming with police officers regarding his knowledge
about methamphetamine (R. 136:10). He also acknowledged that he knew a person
named Scott who had been living in Carol's house at some point and who had shoplifted
10

pseudoephedrine (R. 136:11-12). In addition, he told the officers that he had recently
been to a chemistry store but had bought nothing (R. 136:13).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly concluded that the state did not establish a connection or
nexus between the methamphetamine laboratory found in the downstairs bedroom and
Appellee. In order to convict Jeff of possessing a precursor or laboratory equipment with
the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation, the state was required to
establish probable cause to believe that Jeff possessed either a controlled substance
precursor or laboratory equipment or supplies. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 (1998).
When the police searched the house on December 16, 1998, they did not find any of these
items in Jeffs possession. Nor did they find these items in any place other than the
downstairs southwest bedroom. The state's case, therefore, necessarily hinged on its
ability to prove that Jeff had constructive possession of the laboratory equipment found in
that room.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the state, the evidence failed to connect Jeff
to the laboratory equipment found in the bedroom rented by Lisa and Jay. Mere
occupancy and knowledge of the contraband are not enough to establish constructive
possession. See State v. Fox. 709 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Utah 1985). Nor is prior use of
drugs or precursors sufficient to establish constructive possession of the lab. See State v.
Layman, 1999 UT 79, ^[16, 985 P.2d 911. Moreover, the evidence in this case
11

demonstrated that the lab belonged to Lisa and Jay, who occupied the room where it was
found, and that Appellee was not involved in the lab. The trial court therefore correctly
concluded that the state had failed to establish a prima facie case and quashed the
bindover.
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE AT THE
PRELIMINARY HEARING WHERE, THE EVIDENCE DID NOT
ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE APPELLEE
POSSESSED THE LABORATORY LOCATED IN THE DOWNSTAIRS
BEDROOM OR OTHERWISE POSSESSED A PRECURSOR OR
LABORATORY EQUIPMENT.
The state charged Appellee with violating Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(l)(a)
and/or(b) (1998) on or about December 16, 1998 (R. 3). The pertinent portions of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 state:
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally:
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage
in a clandestine laboratory operation; [or]
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with an intent to engage
in a clandestine laboratory operation[.]
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 (l)(a), (b) (1998) (emphasis added). The charge was
enhanced to a first degree minimum mandatory first degree felony pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37d-5(l)(d), (f) and (g), based on allegations that the "intended laboratory
operation was to take place or did take place within 500 feet of a residence, place of
business, church, or school," the "clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any
amount of a specified controlled substance," and the "intended clandestine laboratory
12

operation was for the production of [ ] methamphetamine base." Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37d-5 (l)(d), (f), (g) (Supp. 1999).3
The state is correct that the elements for the crime charged in this case, absent the
enhancement, are that the defendant:
(1) knowingly or intentionally
(2) possessed a controlled substance precursor ox possessed
laboratory equipment or supplies
(3) with an intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation.
See Appellant's brief at 10; see also Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 (1998).
In granting Appellee's motion to quash the bindover, the trial judge recognized
that the state had failed to establish probable cause to believe that on December 16, 1998,
Jeff possessed either a controlled substance precursor or laboratory equipment with the
requisite intent. In other words, the hole in the state's case related to the second element,
whether Jeff possessed a precursor or laboratory equipment or supplies, and not to the
third element, whether Jeff had the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation
(R. 137:12). The trial judge recognized this hole in the state's case when he indicated that
the state had failed to establish a connection, i.e. nexus, between Jeff and the
methamphetamine laboratory found in the downstairs bedroom (R. 137:12).
In order to warrant submission of this case to a jury, the state was required to

3

The application of the enhancement is not at issue for purposes of this appeal.
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establish probable cause to believe that on December 16, 1998, Jeff possessed or
constructively possessed the laboratory found in the downstairs bedroom or some other
laboratory equipment or precursor. Since there was no evidence of other laboratory
equipment or precursor being found during the December 16, 1998 search and Jeff did
not occupy the room where the laboratory was located, the state was necessarily required
to establish that Jeff had constructive possession of the laboratory equipment found in the
downstairs bedroom.
The state's focus in its brief on appeal on the third element—whether Appellee had
the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation-is therefore misplaced. See
state's opening brief at 10-13. The state's claim that the trial judge misinterpreted the
statute "to include as an element actual involvement in a clandestine laboratory" is
likewise incorrect. See state's brief at 11. The trial court correctly concluded that the
state failed to establish a sufficient nexus or "connection" between Appellee and the
clandestine laboratory found in the downstairs bedroom and therefore the state failed to
establish probable cause to believe Jeff possessed a precursor or laboratory equipment or
supplies (R. 137:12).
To establish constructive possession, the state must demonstrate that "there was a
sufficient nexus between the accused and the [contraband] to permit an inference that the
accused had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the
[contraband]." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985): see also State v. Hopkins,
14

1999 UT 98, TJ14, 989 P.2d 1065; Layman, 1999 UT 79, ^[13; State v. Salas, 820 P.2d
1386, 1388 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1987). "The
mere occupancy of a portion of the premises where the drug is found cannot, without
more, support a finding of its knowing and intentional possession by the accused."
Hansen, 732 P.2d at 132; see also Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. Instead, M[t]here must be some
additional nexus between the accused and the contraband to show that the accused had the
power and intent to exercise dominion and control over it." Id
"Whether a sufficient nexus between the accused and the [contraband] exists
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319 (citing
State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1264 (Utah 1983)). Due to the "highly factsensitive"nature of this determination, a mechanical list of factors does not control.
Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 14. While it is appropriate to consider "factors [which] were
considered relevant by an appellate court analyzing a factually-similar context," "[t]he
final legal test is the most generally-worded one: [ ] whether there was a sufficient nexus
between the defendant and the [contraband] to permit a factual inference that the
defendant had the power and the intent to exercise control over the [contraband]." Id,
1(15 (citing Fox, 709 P.2d at 318).
The Utah Supreme Court held in Fox that the state had not presented sufficient
evidence to establish that one of the occupants of a house had constructive possession of
marijuana being grown in a greenhouse which was attached to and accessible from the
15

kitchen. Fox. 709 P.2d at 320. The telephone was in Clive Fox's name, he was seen
doing yard work, mail addressed to him was found throughout the house, and "his expired
identification card was found in the room that apparently was his sleeping quarters, which
contained no marijuana or related paraphernalia." Id. at 320. Because "[t]here was not
any evidence at all beyond the possibility that Clive sometimes occupied the premises to
link Clive Fox to the marijuana," the Supreme Court reversed Clive's conviction. Id at
320. In reaching that decision, the Court indicated that occupancy of the premises and
knowledge of the contraband are not sufficient to establish constructive possession. Id
By contrast, the Utah Supreme Court held that the state had presented sufficient
evidence to establish that Clive's brother, Gary, had constructive possession of the
marijuana in the two greenhouses on his property. Id. Among other things, Gary owned
the two bedroom house and had been seen on the premises, the property he owned
contained two greenhouses full of marijuana, one of which was accessible from the
kitchen, his mail was found throughout the house, he arranged for the gas and the gas bills
were in his name, and "his personal effects were in the same room as marijuana, drugrelated paraphernalia, and a book entitled Marijuana Grower ys Guide." Id The
reasonable inference from this evidence is that Gary "had the power and intent to exercise
dominion and control over the marijuana located in [the greenhouses], and was
responsible for growing the marijuana." Id.; see also Hansen, 732 P.2d at 132 ("mere
occupancy of a portion of the premises" does not establish constructive possession).
16

In Layman, the Supreme Court held that the state had not established that the
defendant had constructive possession of contraband found in a pouch on the person of a
passenger in his car. Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 16. Layman drove his father and Gina
Ziegenhirt to Vernal to sell methamphetamine. IdL, ^|3. When they arrived in Vernal,
they went to a motel. Id, ^[4. Defendant went into the bathroom for awhile, then
defendant's father went into the bathroom for quite awhile where he measured
methamphetamine. IdL The father gave Gina a pouch with methamphetamine, which she
understood to belong to the father and herself. Id, ^5. Gina placed the pouch in her
waistband. Id. After defendant dropped off his father, police officers stopped the vehicle,
searched Gina and found the methamphetamine. Id., ^|6, 7, 8. Although Layman had
needle marks on his arm, behaved erratically after officers stopped the vehicle, used drugs
sometime earlier, and shook his head in a negative fashion at Gina when officers asked to
see the pouch containing methamphetamine, the Court upheld this Court's conclusion that
there was insufficient evidence to establish that Layman had constructive possession of
the pouch. The Court stated:
When all the brush is cleared, the critical fact is that there was little
evidence to prove that Michael had such control over Gina's person that one
could reasonably infer beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and
intentionally possessed the drugs and paraphernalia in her pouch. The only
fact tending to prove Michael's control over Gina is that she looked at him
when the deputy requested to see the pouch and that Michael shook his
head in a negative fashion. This simply is not enough. All the other
evidence in this case does nothing to address this critical factual issue.
Neither her presence in his vehicle, his erratic behavior after the traffic stop,
17

nor his use of drugs at some earlier time make up for this critical lack of
evidence.
Lavman. 1999 UT 79,1[16.
This Court likewise held in Salas that the state did not produce sufficient evidence
to establish that the defendant had constructive possession of cocaine found in the
backseat of an automobile which he was driving and owned. Salas, 820 P.2d at 1389.
This Court reasoned that Salas was not the sole owner of the vehicle and there were two
passengers, one of which had easier access to the cocaine. Id In addition, the drug was
in an area that was not easily accessible to Salas, Salas "denied the presence of cocaine
before the search, did not try to escape the scene during the search, denied putting the
cocaine in the vehicle after it was discovered, and did not have drugs or drug
paraphernalia on his person at the time of arrest." Id A backseat passenger close to the
drug moved around in a furtive manner right before the traffic stop. Id Because the only
evidence other than the defendant's ownership and occupancy of the vehicle was
inadmissible hearsay, this Court held that the state did not establish a sufficient nexus
between Salas and the contraband. Salas, 820 P.2d at 1389.
By comparison, in State v. Rivera, 906 P.2d 318 (Utah App. 1995) (reversed in
part on other grounds, 943 P.2d 1344), this Court held that the state had presented
sufficient evidence to bind the defendant over on the charge of possession of a dangerous
weapon by a restricted person. Id at 319-20. Applying the directed verdict standard
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enunciated in Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783, this Court concluded that there was probable
cause to believe the defendant had constructive possession of a Ruger handgun found in
the truck defendant was driving when he was apprehended. The owner of the truck did
not own a Ruger handgun; the owner's son, who was in possession of the truck for awhile
before defendant drove it, did own a Ruger, but he had possession of his Ruger when the
defendant was arrested. Rivera, 906 P.2d at 319-20. The officer testified that the gun
was on the floor of the passenger side of the truck. Id. at 320. This Court concluded that
since defendant had exclusive possession of the truck, he had constructive possession of
the gun which was in plain sight. Id. at 320.
Tracking the state's depiction of the evidence at 14-15 of its brief, the evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing to support the charge (absent the enhancement)
when viewed in the light most favorable to the state is as follows:
1.

Jeff, Carol, who owned the house, and Jay and Lisa, who
rented the room where the methamphetamine laboratory was
found, were all methamphetamine users (R. 136:29, 42, 55).

2.

Jeff boasted that he was involved in methamphetamine
production, and claimed that he knew how to make it and was
planning on making some at some time. Carol did not know
where or when that might be (R. 136:43-4, 56).4

4

Citing R. 136:43-44, the state claims that the evidence established that Jeff had been
involved in methamphetamine production. State's opening brief at 14. The cited pages of the
transcript indicate only that Jeff claimed to be involved with making methamphetamine, not that
he actually was (R. 136:43-44).
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3.

Jeff had brought some methamphetamine, about an eight-ball,
back to the house and shared it with Carol at some point
(R. 136:49).

4.

About three weeks prior to the incident charged in this case,
Jay and Lisa wanted to condense some oil. Carol thought it
was not hazardous and was curious, so she let Jay and Lisa
condense the oil in her room. Jeff, who had not yet moved
into Carol's house, was at the house for Thanksgiving, and
spent most of the day watching television in another room.
After Jay and Lisa were finished, Jeff went in to clean up and
attempted to recondense the oil that Jay and Lisa had been
condensing (R. 136:9, 41, 42, 58, 59, 62-3).

5.

Jeff "kept talking about wanting to throw a big batch, and that
was as far as that conversations went. [Carol] felt they were
chasing tails" (R. 136:56).

6.

Jeff planned to purchase iodine, but Carol did not know
whether he ever did so. Carol knew that Jeff had purchased
pseudoephedrine at some point, but did not specify when.
Jeff did not tell Carol the purpose of the pseudoephedrine
purchase, but Carol assumed it was purchased to make
methamphetamine. Carol explained that because only a
limited amount of pseudoephedrine can be purchased, others
often purchase pseudoephedrine then sell it to pay off debts or
get methamphetamine (R. 136:44-5).

7.

Jeff had been to a chemistry store "not too long ago." He was
just checking it out and did not purchase anything
(R. 136:13).

8.

On one occasion, Carol had seen Jeff put pseudoephedrine
tablets in a bowl in her bedroom. Carol did not specify when
that occurred. Carol believed Jeff added something to the
tablets; she did not "know if it was acetone or alcohol or
what." Pseudoephedrine is used in the production of
methamphetamine (R. 136:36, 47-8, 59-61).
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Red phosphorous is removed from the striker plates of
matchbooks. Carol saw Jeff rip apart a six or eight packs of
matchbooks. The matchbooks were thrown out in the garbage
and never made it to a methamphetamine lab (R. 36:36, 48,
60,61).
9.

At the time Carol saw Jeff rip up the matchbooks, she and Jeff
were contemplating the idea of setting up Carol's husband by
making it look like he was involved in methamphetamine
production. The matchbooks were thrown away and never
made it to a lab. Carol could not recall whether the incident
involving the pseudoephedrine tablets also occurred when she
and Jeff were thinking about setting up her ex-husband. The
pseudoephedrine tablets never made it to a lab. Carol was not
sure whether they had been thrown away or flushed down the
toilet or what happened to them (R. 136:60-1).

10.

When officers searched Carol's house on December 16, 1998,
they found items associated with a methamphetamine
laboratory in the downstairs, southwest bedroom. Carol
leased that bedroom to Lisa Taylor, who shared the bedroom
with Jay Williams. Jay was an MA methamphetamine cook"
and Lisa was very knowledgeable about methamphetamine
production and chemicals. The officers were unable to locate
Jay and Lisa; they are not charged as co-defendants on the
Information. Carol did not believe Jeff was involved in any
way with the methamphetamine production in the laboratory
in the basement of her house (R. 136:3, 29, 33-6, 43, 54, 55).

11.

The officers found some "finished product" in the downstairs
bedroom where the lab was located (R. 136:33-6).

12.

When the officers asked Jeff about the lab downstairs, he said,
"I've heard-Fve heard glass. I heard lab and I heard finish
and, you know, it don't take a rocket scientist to put it all
together." Other than the fact that Jeff had lived in the house
for about three weeks, there is no evidence that he had access
to the room occupied by Jay and Lisa. Carol testified that Jeff
was not involved in the lab in the downstairs bedroom; Jeff
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also told officers that he was not involved in the lab
(R. 136:10,43).
In this case, the state did not present sufficient evidence to establish probable cause
to believe that Jeff had constructive possession of the laboratory equipment in the
downstairs bedroom. In other words, the state's evidence did not establish "a sufficient
nexus between the accused and the [contraband] to permit an inference that the accused
had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the
[contraband].f! Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. Because the state did not "produce enough
evidence to survive a motion for directed verdict with respect to each element of the
crime" ( Talbot. 972 P.2d at 438 (citing Pledger. 896 P. 2d at 1229)), the trial judge
correctly quashed the bindover.
The evidence in this case unequivocally established that Lisa rented the downstairs
bedroom where the laboratory was found, and that she shared that room with Jay. Jeff
shared an upstairs bedroom with Carol. Other than Jeffs occupancy of the house for
about two to three weeks, the state presented no evidence linking Jeff to the laboratory or
the finished product found in Jay and Lisa's room.

M

[M]ere occupancy of a portion of the

premises where the [contraband] is found cannot, without more, support a finding of its
knowing and intentional possession by the accused." Hansen, 732 P.2d at 132; see also
Fox,709P.2dat319.
Jeffs general boasts that he was involved in methamphetamine production, knew
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how to make methamphetamine, planned to someday make methamphetamine, and
wanted "to throw a big batchf,did not link him to the laboratory equipment in the
downstairs basement. See Layman, 1999 UT 79, If 16 (use of drugs and involvement in
drug lifestyle does not establish connection between defendant and drugs found in
passenger's pouch). In addition, if Jeff were in fact making methamphetamine in the
downstairs lab, he would have no need to boast that he planned to make it in the future or
that he had made it in the past; the boasts therefore suggest that Jeff was not involved in
the lab found in Carol's house. Moreover, Carol did not take Jeffs boasts seriously and
was certain that he was not involved in the downstairs laboratory.
Prior use of methamphetamine in the house likewise did not establish a connection
between Jeff and the downstairs lab. See id (even though defendant used drugs and had
needle marks, state failed to establish constructive possession of drugs in passenger's
pouch). Moreover, the fact that Jeff brought methamphetamine back to the house not
only fails to establish a connection between Jeff and the downstairs lab, it also
demonstrates that Jeff was not involved in the downstairs lab. Had Jeff been involved in
the downstairs lab, there would have been no need to bring methamphetamine back to the
house; he simply could have gone downstairs for it.
Jeffs attempts to recondense oil that Jay and Lisa had condensed in Carol's room
a few weeks earlier also do not link Jeff to the downstairs lab. In fact, the testimony
regarding this incident indicates that Jay and Lisa, who rented the room where the lab was
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found, were the methamphetamine cooks, not Jeff. Indeed, Jeff merely played around
with the oil, attempting to recondense it, after Jay and Lisa were finished.
Nor did Jeffs plans to purchase iodine, his purchase of pseudoephedrine or his
visit to the chemistry store link Jeff to the downstairs lab. There was no evidence that
Jeff actually purchased iodine. Nor was there any evidence that the pseudoephedrine he
purportedly purchased was used in the downstairs lab. The reasonable inference from the
testimony was that Jeff purchased pseudoephedrine to trade or sell. Moreover, the
evidence failed to establish when that purchase was made. The timing of the visit to the
chemistry store likewise was not established and Jeff purchased nothing. Like the needle
marks and use of drugs in Layman, Jeffs interest in methamphetamine was not sufficient
to establish constructive possession of the downstairs laboratory equipment.
The incidents involving the striker plates and the pseudoephedrine tablets also did
not establish a nexus between Jeff and the downstairs lab. Neither the matchbooks nor
the tablets made it to any methamphetamine laboratory, let alone the laboratory
downstairs. If Jeff were involved in the laboratory downstairs, both items would certainly
have ended up there. Instead, the matchbooks were thrown away and the
pseudoephedrine tablets may have been thrown away or flushed down the toilet; either
way, they did not make it to any lab, let alone the lab in the downstairs bedroom. In
addition, the striker plates were removed from the matchbooks, and possibly the
pseudoephedrine tablets were soaked because Carol and Jeff were contemplating setting
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up her ex-husband to make it look like he produced methamphetamine.
Jeffs awareness that Jay and Lisa may have had a methamphetamine lab
downstairs also does not link Jeff to the lab. Just as Clive Fox knew that marijuana plants
were growing in the greenhouse accessible to the kitchen of the house in which he lived,
Jeff was vaguely aware that Jay and Lisa were producing methamphetamine downstairs.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Fox, 709 P.2d at 320, such awareness is not
sufficient to establish constructive possession.
Like the defendant in Salas who denied that the cocaine was his, Jeff denied
involvement in the methamphetamine laboratory found in the downstairs bedroom. See
Salas, 820 P.2d at 1389; see also Fox, 709 P.2d at 319 (lack of incriminating statements
by defendant is one factor which can be considered in determining whether the state has
established constructive possession). Also, like the defendant in Salas, Jeff did not try to
leave while the search was conducted, was cooperative with officers, and did not have
drugs, paraphernalia, precursors, or laboratory equipment on his person or among his
belongings when officers searched the house. See Salas, 820 P.2d at 1389; see also Fox,
709 P.2d at 319 (lack of drugs or paraphernalia is one factor which can be considered in
determining whether state has established constructive possession). These factors were
important to this Court and the Supreme Court in concluding that the state had not
established that Salas or Fox had constructive possession of the contraband; they are
equally important in demonstrating the state's failure to sustain its burden of establishing
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probable cause to believe that Jeff had constructive possession of the methamphetamine
lab in this case. Moreover, although the state took fingerprints in the room where the
laboratory was found, it did not present any evidence that Jeffs fingerprints were found
in that room.
This case is distinguishable from Hopkins, 1999 UT 98. In Hopkins, a
methamphetamine lab was found in the house where Hopkins resided. Laurie Weeks, the
owner of the house, testified that Hopkins asked her to help him make methamphetamine
and had her purchase iodine crystals and pseudoephedrine for him. Hopkins received red
phosphorous in the mail and purchased other ingredients for making methamphetamine.
He offered methamphetamine in exchange for liquid ephedrine over the phone. Hopkins
brought glass jars into the house, which he indicated would be used in manufacturing
methamphetamine. Weeks saw Hopkins manufacture methamphetamine by injecting
something into jars containing methamphetamine oil, then pouring the mixture through
filters. After Hopkins completed the process, Weeks snorted a substance, which she
identified as methamphetamine. Two other people also testified that they saw Hopkins at
the house, engaging in actions which are part of the process of manufacturing
methamphetamine. There was no evidence that the lab was found in a room occupied by
anyone other than Hopkins. Id., 1fl[4-7.
Hopkins argued in the Supreme Court that the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction for possession of the lab. Because Hopkins failed to marshal the evidence
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in support of his conviction, the Supreme Court ,fdecline[d] to treat his contention that the
evidence was insufficient." Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, ^[16.
Even if the Supreme Court had concluded that the evidence was sufficient, the
facts in the present case contrast with those in Hopkins and fail to establish the necessary
connection between Jeff and the lab in the downstairs room. Three witnesses saw
Hopkins engaged in the production of methamphetamine at the house. Id., \J. Weeks
gave detailed testimony regarding Hopkins' efforts to obtain the ingredients necessary for
making methamphetamine and his actual production of methamphetamine. Id By
contrast, in the present case, no one saw Jeff manufacture methamphetamine. Moreover,
unlike Rivera where the defendant was the only person with dominion and control over
the gun (Rivera, 906 P.2d at 319-20), in this case, the totality of the evidence established
that the lab belonged to Jay and Lisa, not Jeff. While Jeff certainly had an interest in
methamphetamine, the evidence did not link him to the lab in the downstairs bedroom
and was therefore insufficient to sustain the conviction for this first degree minimum
mandatory crime.5 The trial judge correctly quashed the bindover.

5

The methamphetamine found in Carol's purse and the "flash residue" in her son's room
were not precursors or laboratory equipment and therefore did fit within the second element of
the statute. Even if they had been precursors or laboratory equipment, however, there was
absolutely no evidence connecting them to Jeff. The state charged only Carol with possession of
the methamphetamine. There is far less evidence connecting Jeff to the methamphetamine in
Carol's purse than there was connecting Layman to the methamphetamine in his passenger's
pouch. See Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 16. Nor is there any evidence linking Jeff to the son's
bedroom.
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f,

When all the brush is cleared" (Layman. 1999 UT 79, ^}16) in this case, the

evidence does not establish that Jeff "had the power and intent to exercise dominion and
control over" (Fox, 709 P.2d at 320) the methamphetamine laboratory found in Jay and
Lisa's bedroom. Jeffs methamphetamine use, his purported activities with striker plates
and pseudoephedrine at some unspecified time, his general plans to make
methamphetamine someday, and his awareness that Jay and Lisa were making
methamphetamine in their room was not sufficient to establish probable cause to believe
Jeff had constructive possession of the laboratory in that room. Moreover, the lack of
evidence indicating that Jeffs fingerprints were in the room, his cooperation with police,
and his insistence, as well as Carol's insistence, that Jeff was not involved in the
laboratory are additional circumstances demonstrating that the state failed to establish
probable cause that Jeff had constructive possession of the laboratory. In this case where
Appellee did not possess precursors or laboratory equipment or supplies and the evidence
failed to establish probable cause to believe that he constructively possessed the
laboratory equipment found in the downstairs bedroom, the trial judge correctly quashed
the bindover and dismissed the case.
CONCLUSION
Appellee/Defendant Jeff Reed respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial
court order quashing the bindover and dismissing the charge.
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SUBMITTED this j?5"& day of April, 2000.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee

STEVEN G. SHAPIRO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee

29

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered the original
and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th
Floor, P. O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Utah
Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor,
P. O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this jjftt

day of April, 2000.

JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's
Office as indicated above this

day of April, 2000.

30

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

STEVEN G. SHAPIRO (6330)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

"-CClfQ 0;, ,. ,
'.^••/.::rr-

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE"J0F~UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
v.
JEFF CLAUDE REED,

Case No. 981925686FS
JUDGE WILLIAM W. BARRETT

Defendant.

This matter, having come before the Court on Defendant's
Motion to Quash Bindover and said Motion having been granted:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled matter is hereby
dismissed.
is * ^ _ _ day of October, 1999.
DATED this
BY THE COURT:

JUDGE WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Third District Court
MAILED/DELIVERED

a copy of the

foregoing to the County

Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Suite 300, Utah 84111, this
day of October, 1999.

ADDENDUM B

fcl-4. Prohibited acts — Second degree felony.
is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally:
:(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage
a clandestine laboratory operation;
T(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage
"a clandestine laboratory operation;
^:(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical, laboratory
juipment, or laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to
elieve it will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation;
f
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled
[Substances Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under that act,
lowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the material distribor received will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation;
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory
[[operation;
(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or
uifacture a controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized
|ander Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act; or
^(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the
itent to distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or
Fronveying the controlled or counterfeit substance or by any other person
^regardless of whether the final destination for the distribution is within
Ithis state or any other location.
I) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) is guilty of a second
felony.

*7d-5. Prohibited acts — First degree felony.
Hi) A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a), (b), (e), or (f) is guilty of
|«rst degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the following
itions occurred in conjunction with that violation:
(a) possession of a firearm;
(b) use of a booby trap;
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dan^gerous material or while transporting or causing to be transported
^materials in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation, there was
^created a substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to the
environment;
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place
j: within 500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school;
(e) any phase of the clandestine laboratory operation or production or
Manufacture of a controlled or counterfeit substance involved a person less
than 18 years of age;

